Resolution 2551 (2020)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 8775th meeting, on 12 November 2020
The Security Council,
Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,
Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, and underscoring the importance of working to prevent destabilising effects of regional disputes from spilling over into Somalia,
Recalling paragraphs 1 to 8 of resolution 2444 (2018), and reaffirming that it will continue to follow developments towards the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti and will support the two countries in the resolution of these matters in good faith,
Expressing its support for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in its efforts to reconstruct the country, counter the threat of terrorism, and stop the movement of illegal arms and armed groups, further expressing its intention to ensure the measures in this resolution will enable the FGS in the realisation of these objectives, noting that the security situation in Somalia continues to necessitate these measures, including strict controls on the movement of arms but affirming that it shall keep the situation in Somalia under constant review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including any modification, possible benchmarks, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed in light of the progress achieved and compliance with this resolution,
Welcoming the recent increased dialogue between leaders of the FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS), emphasising the importance of co-operation and coordination between the FGS and the FMS and implementation of the National Security Architecture, recalling resolution 2520 and reiterating the importance of further progress on updating, reviewing and implementing the Somalia Transition Plan (STP), and noting that a successful transition to Somali-led security from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as set out under the Transition Plan, is fundamental to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region,
Condemning Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, expressing grave concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, particularly through its increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and further expressing grave concern at the continued presence in Somalia of affiliates linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL also known as Da’esh),
Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,
Welcoming progress made by the FGS on weapons and ammunition management (WAM), including the adoption of the National WAM Strategy, urging continued work codifying and implementing weapons and ammunition management policies including developing an accountable weapons tracing system for all Somali security forces, recognising that effective weapons and ammunition management is the responsibility of the FGS and FMS, and encouraging Somalia’s partners to support the FGS and FMS with this, and in line with Somalia’s National Security Architecture and Transition Plan,
Encouraging the FGS to coordinate with international and regional partners regarding its needs in developing its National Security Forces, noting that these forces require access to weapons and specialist equipment, in accordance with the measures in this resolution, in order to perform their functions effectively,
Condemning the supply of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, especially when they reach Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL, and when they undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region, and further condemning continued illegal supply of weapons, ammunition and IED components from Yemen to Somalia,
Recognising that the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to peace, security and stability in Somalia and the region goes beyond the group’s conventional military action and asymmetric warfare, expressing serious concern at Al-Shabaab’s ability to generate revenue as documented in the final report of the Panel of Experts (the Panel) on Somalia (S/2020/949) welcoming the FGS’ efforts to strengthen the Somali Financial Sector to identify and monitor money laundering risks and combat terrorist financing, noting the steps set out by the FGS in the Somalia Transition Plan on institutional capacity building, which seek to develop these capabilities, noting the importance of financial services in enabling Somalia’s economic future, further welcoming efforts by the FGS, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Panel to develop a plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab finances, and urging engagement from the FGS, FMS, Somali financial institutions, the private sector and the international community to support this process,
Welcoming measures taken by the FGS, FMS and United Nations Member States with charcoal destination markets to reduce the export of charcoal, urging monitoring and control of existing charcoal stockpiles at export points, encouraging further development of Somalia’s National Policy on Charcoal which aims to develop the sustainable management of domestic charcoal use expressing concern at continued reports of illegal and unregulated fishing in waters where Somalia has jurisdiction, noting the link between illegal fishing and Al-Shabaab’s ability to generate revenue, encouraging the Somali authorities, with support from the international community, to ensure fishing licenses are issued in accordance with the appropriate Somali legislation, and further encouraging the FGS, FMS and Somali authorities to work with the UNODC, their international partners and other stakeholders to improve maritime domain awareness.
Expressing concern at the continued reports of corruption and diversion of public resources in Somalia, welcoming efforts made by the FGS to reduce corruption including the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Law on 21 September 2019 and establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission, welcoming progress made by the FGS and FMS in strengthening public financial management and the positive work of the Financial Reporting Centre, and calling for the FGS to continue its efforts to address corruption, to ratify the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and to continue to accelerate the pace of reform,
Expressing serious concern at the humanitarian situation in Somalia, noting the combined threat posed by flooding, locust infestation and COVID-19 and condemning in the strongest terms any party obstructing the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, any misappropriation or diversion of any humanitarian funds or supplies, and acts of violence against or harassment of humanitarian workers,
Noting the adoption of conclusions on Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia on 11 August 2020 by the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, further noting with concern reports, including from the Secretary General of the United Nations, which document worrying levels of sexual and gender based violence in Somalia, and urging the Somali authorities to further strengthen efforts to address this, including by implementing measures in line with resolution 2467 (2019).
Taking note with appreciation of the final report of the Panel and the technical assessment mission report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/616), welcoming the increased cooperation between the Panel and the FGS, regretting, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the reduced ability of the Panel to visit Somalia and the wider impact of the pandemic on the Panel’s work in 2020, and urging all parties to find a way forward which will enable the Security Council to better assess and monitor compliance with the sanctions regime, and recalling that panels of experts operate pursuant to mandates from the Security Council,
Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Notes with concern Al-Shabaab’s ability to generate revenue and launder, store and transfer resources, calls upon the FGS to continue working with Somali financial authorities, private sector financial institutions and the international community to identify, assess and mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks, improve compliance (including enhanced Know Your Customer and due diligence procedures) and strengthen supervision and enforcement, including through increased reporting to the Central Bank of Somalia and Financial Reporting Centre in line with the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter the Financing of Terrorism Act (2016) as well as the Mobile Money Regulations (2019), encourages the FGS to consider implementing a national ID programme to help mitigate terrorist financing risks, further encourages support from the international community in addressing these risks and requests the FGS, UNODC and the Panel to continue exchanging information about Al-Shabaab’s finances and to continue working with stakeholders to develop a plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab’s finances;
2. Requests the FGS to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other United Nations Member States, particularly other Member States in the region, and with international partners to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism, including compliance with resolution 1373 (2001), resolution 2178 (2014), resolution 2462 (2019), and relevant domestic and international law, and requests the FGS to submit, in its regular reporting to the Council, an update on specific actions taken by the Somali authorities to counter the financing of terrorism;
3. Calls upon the FGS, in coordination with the FMS, to accelerate the implementation of the National Security Architecture, including decisions around the composition, distribution and command and control of the security forces, welcomes progress on the STP and urges the FGS and FMS to take further steps to update and implement the STP, welcomes progress on weapons and ammunition management and underlines the responsibility of the FGS and FMS to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment and their distribution, including implementation of a system which allows tracking of all such military equipment and supplies to the unit level;
4. Calls upon the FGS and FMS to enhance civilian oversight of their security apparatus, to continue to adopt and implement appropriate vetting procedures of all defence and security personnel, including human rights vetting, and to investigate and as appropriate prosecute individuals responsible for violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, and sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict situations, and in this context recalls the importance of the Secretary-General’s Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy in relation to the support provided by the United Nations to Somali security forces and AMISOM;
5. Calls upon the international community to support implementation of the STP to help develop credible, professional and representative Somali security forces, including providing additional and coordinated support to continue to develop the weapons and ammunition management capacity of the FGS and FMS, with a particular focus on training, storage, support for infrastructure and distribution, technical assistance and capacity building with regard to countering financing of terrorism, and support in tackling the threat of IEDs;
Arms Embargo
6. Reaffirms that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, including prohibiting the financing of all acquisitions and deliveries of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, until the Council decides otherwise (as initially imposed by paragraph 5 of its resolution 733 (1992) and paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002));
7. Decides that weapons and military equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces or Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS in accordance with paragraph 9 of this resolution shall not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the Somali National Security Forces or Somali security sector institution to which it was originally sold or supplied or the selling or supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation;
8. Reaffirms that the FGS, in cooperation with the FMS and AMISOM, shall document and register all weapons and military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates, including recording the type and serial number of the weapon and/or ammunition, photographing all items and relevant markings and facilitating inspection by the Panel of all military items before their redistribution or destruction;
(i) Exemptions, advance approvals and notifications
9. Decides that the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries of weapons and military equipment or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces, or Somalia security sector institutions other than those of the FGS, to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to items in Annex A and B to this resolution and the delivery of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities to Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS, which are subject to the relevant advance approvals and notification procedures as set out in paragraphs 10–17;
10. Decides that deliveries of items in Annex A to this resolution intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces, or Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS, to provide security for the Somali people, require an advance approval by the Committee on a case-by-case basis, submitted at least five working days in advance by the FGS or the State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering assistance;
11. Decides that deliveries of items in Annex B to this resolution intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces, to provide security for the Somali people are subject to notifications to the Committee for information submitted at least five working days in advance by the FGS or the State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering assistance;
12. Decides that deliveries of items in Annex B to this resolution or the delivery of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, intended solely for the purposes of helping develop Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS, to provide security for the Somali people, may be provided in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of receiving a notification from the supplying State or international, regional and sub-regional organisation, and requests States or international, regional and sub-regional organisations to inform the FGS in parallel of any such deliveries at least five working days in advance;
13. Decides that the FGS has the primary responsibility to seek approval from or notify the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 or 11, as applicable of any deliveries of weapons and military equipment to the Somali National Security Forces, at least five days in advance, and that all requests for approvals and notifications should include: details of the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons and military equipment, a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and ammunition, proposed date and place of delivery, and all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces, or the intended place of storage;
14. Decides that the State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering weapons and military equipment to the Somali National Security Forces pursuant to paragraph 10 or 11, may alternatively, make an advance request for approval or notification, as applicable, in consultation with the FGS, decides that a State or international, regional or subregional organisation choosing to do so should inform the appropriate national coordinating body within the FGS of the advance request for approval or notification and provide the FGS with technical support with notification procedures where appropriate, and requests the Committee to transmit advance requests for approval and notifications from States or international, regional or subregional organisations to the appropriate national coordinating body in the FGS;
15. Decides that a State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering any weapon and military equipment, technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities to Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS, pursuant to paragraph 10 or 12, has responsibility for seeking approval from or notifying the Committee, as applicable, for any deliveries of those items, advice, assistance or training, and informing the FGS in parallel at least five working days in advance;
16. Decides that where paragraphs 10 or 11 apply, the FGS shall no later than 30 days after the delivery of weapons and military equipment, submit to the Committee a post-delivery notification in the form of written confirmation of the completion of any delivery to the Somali National Security Forces, including the serial numbers for the weapons and military equipment delivered, shipping information, bill of lading, cargo manifests or packing lists, and the specific place of storage, and recognises the value of the supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation doing the same, in cooperation with the FGS;
17. Reaffirms that the delivery of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use shall be notified to the Committee five days in advance for its information only, by the supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation;
18. Notes with concern reports that States were not adequately following the notification procedures set out in prior resolutions, reminds States of their obligations pursuant to the notification procedures, set out in paragraph 10–17, and further urges States to follow strictly the notification procedures for providing assistance to develop Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS;
(ii) Exceptions
19. Reaffirms that the embargo shall not apply to:
(a) Supplies of weapons or military equipment or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities intended solely for the support of or use by United Nations personnel, including the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); AMISOM’s strategic partners, operating solely under the latest African Union Strategic Concept of Operations, and in cooperation and coordination with AMISOM; and the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia, all as per paragraph 10 (a)–(d) of resolution 2111 (2013);
(b) Supplies of weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of States or international, regional and subregional organisations undertaking measures to suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, upon the request of the FGS and for which the FGS has notified the Secretary-General, and provided that any measures undertaken shall be consistent with applicable international humanitarian and international human rights law;
(c) Supplies of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only;
(d) Entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying weapons and military equipment for defensive purposes provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels (as previously affirmed by paragraph 3 of resolution 2244 (2015));
Targeted sanctions in Somalia
20. Recalls its decisions in its resolution 1844 (2008) which imposed targeted sanctions and its resolutions 2002 (2011), and 2093 (2013) which expanded the listing criteria, and recalls its decisions in its resolutions 2060 (2012) and 2444 (2018), and further recalls that the listing criteria includes, but is not limited to, planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender based violence and reiterates its request for Member States to assist the Panel of Experts in its investigations, and for the FGS, FMS and AMISOM and partners to share information with the Panel of Experts regarding Al-Shabaab activities especially where covered by listing criteria;
21. Requests the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011), and invites the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the Committee, as appropriate;
22. Decides that without prejudice to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of its resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialised agencies or programmes, humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia;
Somalia Charcoal ban
23. Condemns any exports of charcoal from Somalia in violation of the total ban on the export of charcoal, reaffirms its decision regarding the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of its resolution 2036 (2012) (“the charcoal ban”), and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014), and decides to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) until 15 November 2021;
24. Welcomes measures taken by the FGS, FMS and Member States to reduce the export of charcoal from Somalia, reiterates its requests that AMISOM support and assist the FGS and FMSs in implementing the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia, encourages further development of Somalia’s National Policy on Charcoal to develop the sustainable management of domestic charcoal use, encourages the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to provide the FGS with data and enhanced analysis on domestic charcoal production to inform the development of the FGS National Policy on Charcoal and calls upon AMISOM to facilitate regular access for the Panel to charcoal exporting ports;
25. Reaffirms the importance of the efforts of the UNODC and its international partners to monitor and disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia, and encourages the UNODC, within its current mandate, under the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime, to bring together relevant States and international organisations, including European Naval Force Operation Atalanta, Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and other naval forces in the region to enhance regional cooperation on responding to illicit maritime flows and disrupt all forms of trafficking in licit and illicit goods that may finance terrorist activities in Somalia, and supporting the FGS and FMS to improve their maritime domain awareness, including the role of fishing vessels in trafficking and illicit trade;
IED components ban
26. Noting the increase in IED attacks undertaken by Al-Shabaab, decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in part I of Annex C to this resolution to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) will be used, or a significant risk they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices;
27. Further decides that, where an item in part I of Annex C to this resolution is directly or indirectly sold, supplied or transferred to Somalia consistent with paragraph 26, the State shall notify the Committee of the sale, supply or transfer no more than 15 working days after the sale, supply or transfer takes place, and stresses the importance that notifications pursuant to this paragraph contain all relevant information, including the purpose of the use of the item(s), the end user, the technical specifications and the quantity of the item(s) to be shipped;
28. Calls upon Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including inter alia items in part II of Annex C, to keep records of transactions and share information with the FGS, the Committee and the Panel regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries into these chemicals by individuals in Somalia and to ensure that the FGS and FMS are provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of materials;
29. Encourages international and regional partners of Somalia to implement continued specialist training of FGS Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and to provide appropriate equipment and coordinate support to reinforce Somali capacity in the analysis of explosives;
Panel of Experts on Somalia
30. Decides to renew, with effect from the date of adoption of this resolution, until 15 December 2021, the Panel on Somalia and that the mandate of the Panel shall include the tasks referred to in paragraph 11 of resolution 2444 (2018) and paragraph 1 of this resolution, requests the Secretary-General to include dedicated gender expertise, in line with paragraph 11 of its resolution 2467 (2019), and expresses its intention to review the mandate of the Panel and take appropriate action regarding any extension to the mandate no later than 15 November 2021;
31. Recalls the importance of full co-operation between the FGS and the Panel, requests the FGS to facilitate for the Panel interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and ISIL held in custody, encourages the FGS to facilitate a visit to Somalia by the Panel as soon as practicable, notes the importance of the Panel carrying out their mandate in line with document S/2006/997, and requests the Panel to give recommendations to the Committee on how to support the FGS in weapons and ammunition management, including efforts towards establishing a National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commission;
32. Reiterates its request for States, the FGS, the FMS and AMISOM to provide information to the Panel, and assist them in their investigations, urges the FGS and the FMS to facilitate access for the Panel, on the basis of written requests to the FGS by the Panel, to all FGS armouries in Mogadishu, all FGS-imported weapons and ammunition prior to distribution, all FGS military storage facilities in Somalia National Army (SNA) sectors and all captured weaponry in FGS and FMS custody, and to allow photographs of weapons and ammunition in FGS and FMS custody and access to all FGS and FMS logbooks and distribution records, in order to enable the Security Council to monitor and assess implementation of this resolution;
Reporting
33. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council with an update, no later than the 31 July 2021 on any further developments towards the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti;
34. Requests the Panel to provide regular updates to the Committee, including a minimum of four different thematic reports, a comprehensive mid-term update and, for the Security Council’s consideration, through the Committee, a final report by 15 October 2021 and urges the Panel to seek feedback from the Committee on the findings of their reporting;
35. Requests the Secretary-General to provide to the Council, no later than 15 September 2021 a technical assessment of Somalia’s weapons and ammunition management capability and recommendations to improve it further;
36. Requests the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Security Council by 15 October 2021 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia;
37. Requests the FGS to report to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), by 1 February 2021 and then by 1 August 2021, on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of its security forces, and the status of regional and militia forces, including as annexes the reports of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 (2014), and incorporating the notifications regarding the destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces or the place of storage of military equipment upon distribution of imported arms and ammunition, and requests future reports of the JVT to cross-reference serial numbers of weapons documented by the JVT with available records detailing the distribution of arms to the security forces;
38. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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